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16 October 1958

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

THE TAIWAN SITUATION Page 1

Chinese Communist Defense Minister Peng Te-huai's order for an additional two-week cease-fire, along with Peiping's more moderate propaganda, suggests that the Chinese Communists hope to move toward their objectives with diplomatic and political tactics for the time being. While Peiping has been testing US intentions with a self-imposed cease-fire, it has continued to improve its military capabilities in and near the Strait area.

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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Page 4

The appointment of a four-man Lebanese cabinet has resulted in a cessation of violence, but President Shihab may soon face new difficulties. Economic conditions in Iraq are stagnating, and political tensions have only been partially eased by the departure of ex-Deputy Premier Arif. In Jordan, agitation for a change in government continues; King Husayn plans to leave the country on vacation early in November after the departure of British troops.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TUNISIAN-UAR DISPUTE Page 1

The blast against the UAR delivered at the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo on 11 October by Tunisian President Bourguiba's representative, which led to a formal rupture of diplomatic relations between Tunis and Cairo, may precipitate an all-out effort by Nasir to drive the Tunisian leader from power. Cairo propaganda is denouncing Bourguiba as "the imperialists' tool," and Nasir now may increase his covert assistance to Tunisian subversive elements. Bourguiba's action immediately after Tunisia joined the league has left him, at least for the moment, without overt support from other Arab states and may have weakened his domestic position as well.

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~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD review(s) completed.

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958****PART II (continued)****DE GAULLE CHECKS RIGHTIST SUPPORTERS Page 2**

The first real measure of De Gaulle's authority over the military and rightist extremists who brought him to power will be provided by the degree of compliance with his directive that the military get out of Algerian politics and that all Moslems except terrorists be given opportunity to participate in the November elections for the French National Assembly. In France itself, De Gaulle is continuing his efforts to prevent dominance of the next National Assembly by an ultranationalist rightist bloc led by Information Minister Jacques Soustelle. [REDACTED]

25X1

SOVIET PRESSURES ON FINLAND Page 3

Increasing Soviet pressures on Finland appear aimed at bringing about the fall of the present coalition government--the most conservative in Finland since 1945--and replacing it with one more favorably disposed toward the USSR. Moscow has stalled trade talks expected to begin in early October. Any curtailment of Soviet purchases would eventually increase Finland's unemployment--a key issue in the survival of the Fagerholm government. [REDACTED]

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BELGRADE CONCERNED OVER INCREASING POPULAR DISSATISFACTION Page 4

The Yugoslav regime is again worried over increased popular dissatisfaction with general living conditions, and measures designed to improve them have been instituted with considerable publicity. There is little chance that this dissatisfaction will pose a threat to the regime. The ideological dispute with the bloc is serving less and less to distract popular attention from internal economic problems. [REDACTED]

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SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958****PART II (continued)****SOVIET NINE-MONTH PLAN FULFILLMENT Page 5**

The rate of growth of Soviet industrial production during the first nine months of 1958 assures that, as in 1957, the annual rate will be well above plan. Industrial production to date is reported 10 percent over the corresponding period of 1957, as compared with a planned increase of 7.6 percent for the year. Only six of the 104 regional economic administrations failed to meet their goals. [REDACTED]

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LYSENKO FINDS NEW POLITICAL SUPPORT Page 6

Trofim Lyenko, one-time "tsar" of Soviet biological research, has apparently regained some of the prestige he lost shortly after Stalin's death. Awarded the Order of Lenin at his recent 60th birthday "for services rendered in developing agricultural science and practical assistance in production," Lyenko within the last year has also heard himself publicly praised as a practical agronomist by Khrushchev. Lyenko's genetic theories are still in disrepute with many Soviet scientists, however, and he apparently has not succeeded in re-establishing his dominance over Soviet biological research. [REDACTED]

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SOVIET TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CHANGING Page 7

The reorganization of industry which was launched last year called for more local administrative initiative and is bringing about fundamental changes in the pattern of Soviet telecommunications. The predominant pattern, that of circuits radiating from Moscow, has been altered by the emergence of a number of new circuits between other important USSR cities. The Soviet telecommunications system is not very advanced, however, and it probably will not be entirely adequate for a number of years. [REDACTED]

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POLITICAL REORGANIZATION IN SOVIET MILITARY CONTINUES . . Page 8

The USSR is continuing a reorganization of the Chief Political Directorate (GPU) of the Soviet Army and Navy. The reorganization is apparently another attempt to solve the problem of imposing political training on an indifferent officer corps--this time by assigning higher ranking and presumably better qualified officers to the directorate. [REDACTED]

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111

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958****PART II (continued)**

25X6

LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT SURVIVES TEST Page 10

Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone has survived a critical test in the National Assembly over the monetary reform issue. While the government still faces a struggle over the budget, its prospects for survival are considerably improved. It may now devote its attention to the reforms and antisubversive measures necessary to check Communist growth in the countryside and to prepare for the national elections which will probably be held in late 1959 or 1960.

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DISCONTENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM Page 11

Considerable discontent has developed in South Vietnam with the Diem regime. Criticism is directed primarily against the President's relatives and close associates, but his authoritarian tactics are also under fire. There is no alternative strong figure to hold divisive forces in check, and Diem's removal from office would probably lead to political chaos. Diem has begun long-range reform programs which hold promise of mitigating many of the regime's present problems.

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IRELAND'S FOREIGN POLICY Page 12

Since becoming a member in December 1955, Ireland has taken an unusually active role in the United Nations and on several occasions has adopted a position sharply divergent from that of other Western nations. Denying that Ireland's foreign policy approach is inimical to the West, External Affairs Minister Frank Aiken maintains that Ireland, along with other small nations, must take the initiative in an effort to temper "the inflexibility" of the East-West power blocs.

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THE WEST AND THE DANUBE RIVER Page 13

Austria's imminent adherence to the bloc-dominated Eastern Danube Convention on navigational rights has resulted in new pressure from the French for a Western initiative to renegotiate the 1948 convention. The French hope that bloc members of the convention can be induced to revise the agreement in return for Western recognition, Austrian and German membership, and some link with the United Nations.

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SECRET

iv

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

PART II (continued)

25X6

BRAZILIAN ELECTION RETURNS Page 15

The illegal but influential Brazilian Communist party has suffered a setback in the important Sao Paulo and Federal District areas as a result of the 3 October congressional and gubernatorial elections. President Kubitschek's middle-of-the-road Social Democratic party has apparently lost heavily to both the right and the left in other contests but seems certain to retain its position as the single largest party in the Brazilian Congress. [REDACTED]

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EGYPT'S COTTON SITUATION Page 16

Egypt failed to sell for cash a substantial amount of its cotton during the recently concluded marketing year. While the West purchased nearly 12 percent more cotton than in the previous season, the Sino-Soviet bloc, which buys on a barter basis, took nearly 60 percent of Egypt's total cotton exports. Successful marketing of the present crop will depend chiefly on increased exports to the Communist world. [REDACTED]

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PART III**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES****COMMUNISTS DROP CONCEPT OF CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT Page 1**

In an attempt to adjust Communist doctrine to current political objectives as well as to the USSR's present international position, Soviet ideologists have virtually abandoned the theory of "capitalist encirclement." In its place has emerged the doctrine of "two world camps," which foresees the eventual victory of Communism

SECRET

v

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958****PART III (continued)**

in the world arena through aggressive but primarily peaceful political maneuvers. At the same time, however, it is emphasized that the ending of capitalist encirclement is not the signal for the "withering away" of the Soviet state, which must instead be strengthened against the last-ditch hostility of the "imperialists," as primarily manifested in the ring of military bases on foreign soil.

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NEW ROLE FOR PAKISTAN'S ARMY Page 4

Since the Mirza-Ayub take-over on 7 October, Pakistani military leaders are exercising power they had shunned in the past. In its new role, the army may not be able to remain immune to the political pressures, factionalism, and corruption which it has condemned among Pakistan's politicians. Prolongation of martial law probably would eventually undermine its prestige in the country, especially in East Pakistan, and lessen its effectiveness as a stabilizing force.

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LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESSES Page 8

The Uruguayan and Honduran Communist parties have recently held national congresses, and the parties in four other countries--Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico--may also do so within the next six months. Only two such meetings were held during the preceding two years. The newly won legal status of these parties in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela may account in part for the timing of congresses in those countries. Soviet criticism of Latin American Communist parties late last year for lack of coordination of their activities may also have stimulated efforts to convene these congresses as a means of correcting the deficiency.

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ANNEX**SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA Page 12**

25X1

SECRET

vi

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

25X1

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

PART I**OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST****THE TAIWAN SITUATION**

Defense Minister Peng Tehuai's order to the Chinese Communist Army at the "Fukien Front" calling for a two-week suspension of shelling suggests that Peiping foresees an extended cease-fire period during which the United States will be under various pressures to make some concessions in the Warsaw talks. The Chinese Communists apparently are convinced that a shift to diplomatic maneuvering and political tactics will at least maintain the pressure of international and domestic opinion on the United States and may well result in the rallying of even more public sentiment for their position.

Peiping is claiming that the initial reduction in tension in the area results from its cease-fire orders and that these are widely acknowledged as an "initiative" which demonstrates the sincerity of Chinese Communist interest in avoiding major hostilities. The Chinese Communists are now demanding that the United States "begin" negotiations--suggesting a new phase in the situation in which the United States presumably would act to make the Chinese Nationalists start withdrawing their forces from the offshore islands. Peiping probably believes that American proposals to the Nationalists calling for reductions are more likely during a period when the United States is not "under the gun." Peng's 6 and 12 October orders indicate that the Communists foresee sharp Nationalist objections to any such American proposals.

The People's Daily editorial of 11 October discussing the period of suspended shelling--a statement which clearly anticipated an extension of Peng's first order--contains a hint that the Communists envisage a relatively long period of the de facto cease-fire. It calls for American "sincerity" in the Warsaw talks and predicts that a settlement is "still far ahead, and more observations and tests have still to be carried out." The "tests" refer to five conditions or "passes" which the United States is required, by the editorial, to cross before permanent peace can be achieved in the strait area.

These are: "(1) stop escorting, (2) stop violating the territorial sea and air of the Chinese mainland, (3) stop military provocations and war threats, (4) stop interfering in China's internal affairs, and (5) withdraw the whole of American armed strength from Taiwan and the Penghu Islands." The United States is said to have been moving along the first two "passes" but willingness to cross the remaining three "has yet to be proved by deeds."

Propaganda

Peiping is still maintaining a generally strong mood in propaganda concerning the Taiwan Strait situation, but over the past month it has somewhat moderated its statements which had implied a direct military challenge to the United States. Its present line probably reflects

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

its belief that earlier tactics to deter strong American support for the Nationalists have not been successful.

In contrast to the People's Daily warning of 9 September that American convoying would "result in armed clashes with China at any moment," the present line carries no such predictions, instead maintaining Communist China's willingness to "negotiate peacefully" and insisting that the United States voluntarily cease convoy activity and "intrusions." In his cease-fire order of 6 October, Defense Minister Peng Te-huai did not threaten to force the United States out of the Taiwan Strait area and stated in relatively mild language that if American forces do not withdraw quickly, "they will always be on the defensive." Peng's 12 October order extending the cease-fire also failed to specify direct retaliation against American naval vessels, should convoying be resumed.

25X1 The propaganda pendulum has swung sufficiently far for the United States to be described as a "great nation" possessing considerable strength and striking power, as opposed to the "paper tiger" caricature of a month ago. Shao Li-tzu of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Military Committee, a puppet party used by Peiping to encourage Nationalist defections, may have voiced the actual views of the regime's leaders when he told a Hong Kong journalist that Communist China would win any war with the help of the bloc, but that "the consequent major devastation would retard Chinese progress indefinitely." The journalist, who was on the mainland in September, reported his impression that the Chinese

Communists were anxious to proceed with domestic consolidation and "preferred negotiations and maneuver to war."

Peiping continues its efforts to maintain the pose of an aggrieved party in the present situation and to keep up some degree of tension among the mainland population. A Sidewinder exhibition which opened in Peiping on 14 October "depicts the crime of the American aggressor for directing the Chiang Kai-shek air force to use the Sidewinder guided missile." The "crime" is equated with alleged dropping of "germ bombs" and flights of US balloons over the mainland. When parts of the Sidewinder were originally found in Chekiang Province, Peiping promised "punitive" action against the Chinese Nationalist Air Force. There was no such threat in this announcement.

The numbered warnings to the United States deplore "intrusions" into the Matsu area, except for one recent warning concerning an island near Hong Kong, and appear to be complaints against American naval and air patrol activity within 12 miles of the seaward side of the Matsu Islands. In addition to their desire to achieve an American disengagement, the Chinese Communists believe there is a political advantage in augmenting the record of alleged US violations of Communist-claimed territorial waters.

On 15 October, Radio Moscow broadcast the text of a letter from Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai to Khrushchev and Voroshilov. Dated 10 October, the letter expressed official appreciation for the support of the USSR in the Taiwan

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

Strait crisis and, specifically, for the statement by Khrushchev that "an attack against China was an attack against the Soviet Union." The letter referred to "American military provocations" and suggested that Khrushchev's statement had been "very effective" in "forcing the aggressors to think hard about their fate." It concluded with a pledge for continued close alignment between Peiping and Moscow.

Military Situation

While Peiping has been testing US intentions with a self-imposed cease-fire, it has continued to improve its military capabilities in and near the strait area.

The Chinese Nationalists continue to report a high level of activity around Communist artillery positions opposite both Chinmen and the Matsus.

An air clash took place on the morning of 10 October, probably initiated by the Nationalists in order to achieve a victory on their national holiday. Five MIG's were destroyed, one probably destroyed, and one Nationalist F-86 was lost. The Nationalists have since announced that their pilots have been ordered to refrain from all penetrations of the mainland, and Nationalist reconnaissance missions have been canceled for the time being. Total Nationalist military casualties by enemy action at the time of the cease-fire were 489 killed, 2,066 wounded, and 41 missing. There were 80 civilians killed and 221 wounded.

Chinese Nationalist Reaction

The Chinese Nationalist reaction to the Chinese Communist extension of the cease-fire appears to be to refrain from fur-

ther provocative actions. Taipei is emphasizing that the extension is a "deceitful trick" brought on by a failure to achieve results by military action or through the Warsaw talks and that it is also an endeavor to sow discord between the Nationalists and Americans. Some believe that the Communists may be reluctant to resume military action against the islands and are shifting to political negotiations with the United States to gain their ends.

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A Taipei newspaper published by a ranking member of the Kuomintang stated on 14 October that the Nationalist Government probably will accept a request by the United States to reduce military forces on Chinmen and Matsu if America agrees to defend the islands. The report probably was a trial balloon to assess American reaction.

The Nationalists have demonstrated surprising initiative, energy, and good control in planning, shipping, and receiving supplies on Chinmen. They delivered about 20,000 tons of all categories of supplies between 6 and 13 October, including six more eight-inch howitzers for counterbattery fire. American observers who have visited Chinmen report that morale is high. The observers noted, however, that part of the high morale can be attributed to a feeling of relief that the firing has been suspended.

The Taiwan Defense Command, reflecting on the strait crisis, believes that resupply of Chinmen in fact was never a critical problem. The panic was created by the Nationalist Government in an attempt to involve the United States in their "never-to-die hope" of returning to the mainland.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS**Lebanon**

Appointment of the new Lebanese four-man cabinet has enabled the Christian militants to call off their strike and has forestalled a general strike by trade unions which had been scheduled for 15 October in protest against the failure of the politicians to reach a compromise. The size of the cabinet is a measure of the compromisers' desperation. Still headed by Prime Minister Rashid Karame, it includes representatives from only two of Lebanon's religious communities and will almost certainly have to be broadened to keep other elements relatively satisfied. New difficulties may well arise over the cabinet's expansion, and also over the ministerial statement which it normally must present to Parliament when it seeks a confidence vote. This vote is scheduled for 17 October.

The popular reaction to the new cabinet is one of relief. The political leaders are less happy, and no faction will regard it as more than a very temporary measure. The Christian pro-Chamoun element will probably seek to keep up political pressure against any further increase of UAR influence, urging an early return to the system of a confessional balance of power which has prevailed heretofore in the country.

Iraq

After three months in office, the Iraqi revolutionary regime has yet to demonstrate that it can even in small measure fulfill promises made at the time of the July coup.

Political tension is reported still high, despite the departure on 12 October of ex-Deputy Premier Arif to take his new post as ambassador to West Germany. Observers of Arif's departure believe Prime Minister Qasim and other officials were at the airport primarily to make sure Arif got on the plane. He has not yet presented himself to the Bonn Foreign Ministry, although he landed in Munich on schedule.

The American Embassy has reported that Qasim's principal advisers are members of the National Democratic party, led by Kamil Chadirchi and Mohammed Hadid, who are known to discount heavily any threat from Communist activity in Iraq. The speech made last week end by Economy Minister Kubba at the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet trade agreement went somewhat beyond the normal flowery expressions of gratitude and esteem which Arab politicians have become used to offering Soviet representatives.

Economic problems are also developing, with growing unemployment as a result of the halt in work on development projects and a widespread belief among laborers that the revolution meant there was no further need to work. Under these political and economic conditions, the next few weeks may well be critical for the regime, and stronger pressures seem likely to develop from both the right and the left. In the background is the Kurdish minority problem, since the Kurds' expectations of autonomy or independence have been raised by the revolution and by the return of their leaders from jail and exile.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958****Jordan**

King Husayn now is reported planning to leave for a European vacation the first week of November, shortly after the departure of the British troops. The clandestine "Free Jordan" radio, which apparently operates from a mobile transmitter just over the Syrian border, is keeping up a steady barrage on the "traitor government" in Amman. Elements within the government are also still maneuvering against Prime Minister Samir Rifai, but the King, at least in public, has solidly backed Rifai.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

PART II**NOTES AND COMMENTS****TUNISIAN-UAR DISPUTE**

The anti-UAR blast delivered in Cairo on 11 October by Tunisian President Bourguiba's representative at a public session of the Arab League Council has led to a formal rupture of diplomatic relations between Tunis and Cairo. It may also precipitate an all-out effort by Nasir to oust Bourguiba and bring a more subservient regime to power in Tunis.

The representative's charge that "some Arab countries" try to dominate league meetings was followed by a Tunisian Embassy statement which called cooperation between Tunisia and the UAR "impossible" and said his country had "no faith whatsoever in the UAR Government." Tunisia also announced it would boycott the remainder of the present council session.

Behind the Tunisian President's seemingly rash frontal assault on the Cairo government and his flouting of the "mystique" of Arab unity lies Bourguiba's long-developing antagonism toward the Nasir regime. This animosity springs particularly from the fact that Nasir has long harbored and apparently also

to Bourguiba's exiled political rival, Salah ben Youssef, a pan-Arab extremist. Since the revelation last March of seemingly firm evidence establishing Cairo's connivance with Ben Youssef, in a plot aimed at Bourguiba's assassination, the Tunisian leader's enmity toward Nasir has become a virtual obsession. Late last month it led him to recall his ambassador from Cairo, and on 15 October he severed all diplomatic ties with the UAR.

The UAR has responded with a continuing press and radio campaign in which the Tunisian statements are equated with the views of "the imperialists" and Bourguiba himself is reviled, amid allusions to the fate of former Iraqi Premier Nuri Said, as "the imperialists'" choice to "check Nasir" and, thus, Arab nationalism. A particular effort is being made to blame the United States for the Tunisian attitude. Increased UAR assistance to dissident Tunisian elements aiming to overthrow Bourguiba seems certain to follow.

Other league members not directly involved in the dispute --including Morocco and Iraq, two countries which might possibly have joined with Tunisia in a bloc within the league independent of UAR influence--moved quickly to dissociate themselves publicly from the Tunisian action. Initial [redacted] even among league delegations representing governments which share Bourguiba's concern over Nasir's growing ascendancy, was likewise unanimously unfavorable. Particularly condemned on all sides was Bourguiba's use of a ceremonial occasion--especially one arranged specifically to welcome Tunisia into the league--for such a blast at the UAR. 25X1

The Bourguiba government now is endeavoring to rally the support of the Moroccans--to whom a special envoy has been dispatched--and rebel Algerian leaders in Tunis. It is also stepping up its appeals to Washington for new evidence, preferably in the form of early arms deliveries, that the United States is standing behind Bourguiba.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

Although Bourguiba's domestic position is not immediately threatened, hostile elements will probably have some success in exploiting his strong anti-UAR stance. The President's attitude toward Nasir, like his

his pro-Western sympathies, is much more intense than those of even his close associates, while among the masses Nasir's stature appears to have grown in recent months.

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DE GAULLE CHECKS RIGHTIST SUPPORTERS

The first real test of De Gaulle's authority over the military and rightist extremists who brought him to power, will be provided by the degree of compliance with his directive that the military get out of Algerian politics and that all Moslems except terrorists be given opportunity to participate in the November elections for the French National Assembly.

De Gaulle's curt order to all military personnel to withdraw from political activity is intended to drive a wedge between the extremist settlers in the public safety committees and the military who joined them in staging the 13 May coup. He is apparently counting on military willingness to obey a strong government, but he also probably has in mind recent reports that the numerous middle- and working-class settler elements are rallying to his support.

While military members obediently withdrew from the Algeria-Sahara Committee of Public Safety, unconditional military submission to De Gaulle may still be in question. Angry civilians on the committee have warned De Gaulle publicly that they intend to "complete the work of 13 May." Should settler defiance get out of hand, army leaders who warned De Gaulle against actions which might drive the settlers to desperation may again call into ques-

tion Paris' understanding of the local situation.

In metropolitan France, rightist hopes of channeling pro - De Gaulle sentiment to favor ultranationalist objectives are being progressively blunted. De Gaulle's choice of a single-member electoral district will almost certainly block Information Minister Jacques Soustelle's aim of dominating the next National Assembly through his recently organized "Union for the New Republic." The new electoral law should favor the center parties, which are also expected to benefit from pressure reportedly exerted on Soustelle, possibly indirectly by De Gaulle himself, to prevent Soustelle from joining other rightist leaders in an across-the-board electoral alignment which would give the next assembly an overwhelmingly rightist orientation.

De Gaulle is concerned enough over the possibility of a divided or obstreperous assembly to have requested a special study of the possible ramifications of a decision by him to continue as premier rather than to assume immediately the presidency of the Fifth Republic.

Leaders of the rebel National Liberation Front (FLN), who established a "Provisional Algerian Government" last month, are unlikely to cooperate openly with the De Gaulle program and

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SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

25X1

may continue their public denunciation of French policy. Their conspicuous failure to enforce a Moslem boycott of the constitutional referendum may lead them, however, to permit some form of participation by FLN adherents in the forthcoming elections. Rebel leaders appear to be thinking in terms not of running candidates directly but of throwing support behind presently "neutral" Moslems, with the idea of using them to approach the French for later negotiations.

The spokesman at the UN for the "provisional government" warned that if there is no favorable action by France within a reasonable time, there would be a renewal of the war on a bigger scale than before.

SOVIET PRESSURES ON FINLAND

Increasing Soviet pressures on Finland appear aimed at bringing about the fall of the present coalition government--the most conservative in Finland since 1945--and replacing it with one more favorably disposed toward the USSR. Moscow desires the inclusion in the government of the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL)--the largest single party--which has not had cabinet representation since 1948. Finnish Communists are seeking to create an air of crisis around Finnish-Soviet relations by charging that the "rightist" Fagerholm government is pursuing a policy damaging to Finland's neutrality.

The present cabinet, although perhaps the strongest postwar government in Finland, faces acute economic problems, and failure to cope with growing unemployment could lead to its replacement by another coalition, including the SKDL.

The USSR has stalled on talks, which had been expected to begin early in October, to arrange for 1959 trade and for an over-all five-year agreement. Any reduction of Soviet purchases from Finland would intensify the unemployment problems during the next several months.

Other recent Soviet dilatory tactics, which include failure to begin negotiations on an agreed loan, delay in signing a fishing agreement concluded with the former government, and delay in following up economic assistance projects, have been accompanied by indications of Soviet displeasure at the conservative tone of the new cabinet, which includes individuals and parties strongly distrusted by the USSR. Such actions reflect Moscow's belief that Finland's political complexion can be influenced by Soviet economic manipulation.

The USSR may also be concerned over Finland's possible economic association with Western Europe through OEEC and, ultimately, through a European free trade area. A special publication by the Soviet Information Bureau in Helsinki on 8 October alleged that Finland was not buying the quantities of Soviet products stipulated in the commercial agreement between the two countries. The publication also stated that the "one-sided" Western orientation of Finland's trade not only endangers present Finnish-Soviet trade relations, but also limits the possibilities for its future development.

(Concurred in by ORR)

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

BELGRADE CONCERNED OVER INCREASING POPULAR DISSATISFACTION

The Yugoslav regime is again worried over increased popular dissatisfaction with general living conditions, and measures designed to improve them have been instituted with considerable publicity. There is little chance that popular dissatisfaction will pose a threat to the stability of the regime, but Belgrade's ideological dispute with the bloc is serving less and less to distract popular attention from internal economic problems.

There were rumors in Belgrade last August that economic discontent was mounting. Inflationary pressures had grown and little improvement in living standards had been realized, despite advances in industrial production. Tito's speech on 20 August during a tour of Slovenia may well have been prompted by concern over this rising dissatisfaction. He called for unity and support in the face of Soviet pressures and emphasized particularly that he would act to solve local difficulties.

Yugoslav officials began in early September to comment on plans for raising living standards. At that time, trade union chief Vukmanovic-Tempo contributed two articles to Borba which in effect declared that the unions' fundamental task was to promote the continual improvement of the material position of the working people. A meeting of the state secretariat for commodity trade publicized

recently enacted regulations to improve the supply of food to the population and simultaneously criticized local government bodies for not efficiently carrying out these regulations.

On 30 September the regime announced that, effective 1 October, personal incomes of "workers and employees" would be raised an average of 7 percent in order to increase consumption. A rise in the cost of certain consumer goods will limit the actual increase to approximately 4 percent. Since the increase is confined to the socialized sector of the economy, it will benefit the city dweller, whose income in real terms has declined compared with that of the rural population.

During the last week of September the Yugoslav National Bank eased consumer credits to some extent, a fact which is all the more noteworthy in view of a regime statement in mid-August that "no justification exists for the liberalization of consumer credits for any kind of consumer goods."

Most recently, Tito, in a major speech on 12 October, called for better living conditions and declared that the people cannot be expected to "tighten their belts a little more."

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SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

SOVIET NINE-MONTH PLAN FULFILLMENT

The rate of growth of Soviet industrial production during the first nine months of 1958 assures that, as in 1957, the annual rate will be well above plan. The rates of growth last year and thus far this year have almost equaled those which would have been needed to achieve the original goals of the now defunct Sixth Five-Year Plan, which will be superseded by a Seven-Year Plan to be released prior to the party congress in January. TASS reports this year's industrial production to date at 10 percent over the corresponding period of 1957,

The production of crude and rolled steel appears to be ahead of schedule, and the annual plan for crude steel probably will be overfulfilled by about a million tons. Pig iron, on the other hand, is very slightly behind schedule.

The metallurgical-equipment industry did not fulfill its nine-month plan, thus continuing its poor performance. In 1957 there was actually a decrease in output measured in tons as compared with the previous year; this year's production may also be below that of 1956. Production in the machine-building and metalworking industries as a whole, however, is reported 14 percent above last year.

The TASS report gives an optimistic account of the building-materials industry. The goal for precast reinforced concrete may be overfulfilled; last year's output has already been achieved, if not surpassed. Cement production too is on schedule, and the year's plan will probably be fulfilled.

Production of the chemical industry is increasing at about the rate of the last two years but still falls short of levels planned in the original Sixth Five-Year Plan. The rate of increase in mineral fertilizers in particular, although above the plan for 1958, is below what would have been necessary to achieve Sixth Five-Year Plan goals. (Prepared by ORR)

USSR: TRENDS IN IND
(PER)

	PLANNED INCREASE 1958 OVER 1957	ACTUAL INCREASE FIRST 9 MONTHS 1958 OVER SAME PERIOD 1957	ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE NEEDED 1958-60 TO REACH ORIGINAL SIXTH 5-YEAR PLAN GOALS
STEEL	5.0	7.9	10.0
PIG IRON	5.7	5.8	12.6
ROLLED METAL	3.7	8.1	9.4
COAL	5.6	7.5	8.7
PETROLEUM	14.5	15.8	11.0
CEMENT	17.3	17.3	24.0
ELECTRIC POWER	10.3	NOT AVAILABLE	15.0
GROSS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT	7.6	10.0	10.7
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN INDUSTRY	5.4	5.6	9.6

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as compared with a planned increase of 7.6 percent for the year, and only slightly under that reported at midyear. Only six of the 104 sovnarkhozy failed to meet their goals.

Labor productivity was 5.6 percent over the first nine months of 1957. This is a drop from the 6-percent increase reported at midyear, but is still higher than the planned 5.4-percent annual increase. The steady decline in productivity growth from a high of 8 percent in 1955 has apparently been halted.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

LYSENKO FINDS NEW POLITICAL SUPPORT

Trofim Lysenko, onetime "tsar" of Soviet biological research, has apparently regained some of the prestige he lost shortly after Stalin's death. Awarded the Order of Lenin on his recent 60th birthday "for services rendered in developing agricultural science and practical assistance in production," Lysenko within the last year has also heard himself publicly praised as a practical agronomist by Khrushchev. Lysenko's genetic theories are still in disrepute with many Soviet scientists, however, and he apparently has not succeeded in re-establishing his dominance over Soviet biological research.

Lysenko's principles of genetics, as contrasted with classical Mendelian precepts, are based on the theory that heritable changes can be achieved in both plants and animals by modifying their environment. They harmonize, therefore, with the Communist belief that men are molded by their surroundings and that a "new Soviet man" can be formed in a carefully controlled environment.

For this reason, as well as for the promise of rapid successes in agriculture, Lysenko's theories had a strong appeal for Stalin. Under Lysenko's domination, however, the agricultural sciences failed to provide the Soviet Government with sound scientific foundations for many of its agricultural programs and, after Lysenko had succeeded in gagging his opponents, genetics research atrophied.

As part of the reappraisal of agricultural science following Stalin's death, Lysenko became a frequent target of public criticism. From 1953 to 1955, however, he was usually censured for his dictatorial

suppression of contending viewpoints, rather than for his genetic theories.

In 1956, Lysenko resigned as president of the USSR Academy of Agricultural Sciences, but retained the directorship of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences, where he has continued to exercise some influence in Soviet genetics research. He is, however,



LYSENKO

no longer immune to the criticism of his scientific colleagues, some of whom have continued to take issue with his doctrines in professional journals. A number of competent geneticists, moreover, have over the past several years carried on fruitful research outside of Lysenko's jurisdiction. Some agricultural programs which run counter to Lysenko's teachings, most notably the hybrid corn program, are now under way.

Since 1957, Khrushchev has publicly complimented Lysenko on his work in agriculture on four occasions, citing in particular Lysenko's soil-fertilization and livestock-breeding techniques. At the same time, Khrushchev has called on the proponents of different views

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

to set aside scholastic argumentation and to put their theories to the test in the field.

In December 1957 Lysenko was able to use the pages of Izvestia for an emphatic reaffirmation of his controversial theories. The strong pro-Lysenko cast of the Soviet delegation to the International Congress of Genetics in Montreal in August was further evidence that Lysenkoists continue to exert influence among Soviet geneticists.

The continued activity of Lysenko's opponents suggests, however, that this ideological controversy in Soviet science is not yet ended. The political leadership has supported Lysenko where his methods seemed to promise results, but it is not likely to mortgage the future of Soviet biological research to a man whose theories, however ideologically palatable, are scientifically dubious.

(Concurred in by
OSI AND ORR)

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SOVIET TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CHANGING

The reorganization of industry which was launched last year called for more local administrative initiative and is bringing about fundamental changes in the pattern of Soviet telecommunications. The predominant pattern, that of circuits radiating from Moscow, has been altered by the emergence of a number of new circuits between other important USSR cities. These undoubtedly constitute only the beginning of an ultimate network of lateral circuits. A large amount of work remains to be done, accordingly to Soviet sources, and in the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) particular attention will be paid to satisfying the communications needs of the sovnarkhozy.

The economic reorganization appears to have imposed

severe strains on an already inadequate telecommunications system, and telecommunications service will probably not be modern in the Western sense for some years. Existing facilities have proved too inflexible to allow a rapid rearrangement of circuits to meet the changed needs.

Soviet telecommunications are undergoing a consolidation in the USSR Ministry of Communications, one of the few economic ministries left after the reorganization. Control over interurban telecommunications lines which belonged to the now abolished industrial ministries is being transferred to the Ministry of Communications, thus ending a long-standing squabble. This decision may be attacked by the sovnarkhozy,

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

however, on the grounds that telecommunications lines should be placed under their control in cases where closely related production processes which require close continuous coordination are separated geographically.

A major responsibility assigned to the all-union and republic ministries of communica-

tions is the study of the precise needs for telecommunications facilities and services within and between sovnarkhozy. Solution of the problems raised by these studies will hinge largely on the development and provision of high-capacity cable and microwave radio-relay main lines--in short, on bringing the USSR up to advanced Western standards.

(Prepared by ORR)

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POLITICAL REORGANIZATION IN SOVIET MILITARY CONTINUES

The USSR is continuing a reorganization of the Chief Political Directorate (GPU) of the Soviet Army and Navy, which functions as a department of the apparatus of the party central committee. The reorganization is apparently another attempt to solve the problem of imposing political training on an indifferent officer corps, this time by assigning higher ranking and presumably better qualified officers to the directorate.

In October 1957 the GPU "of the Ministry of Defense" began to be called by a new title--the GPU "of the Soviet Army and Navy." The replacement of top personnel started sometime prior to January 1958 with the appointment of Col. Gen. F. I. Golikov to replace Col. Gen. A. S. Zheltov as head of the directorate. Since then there has apparently been a complete turnover in the top positions. The post of first deputy chief, apparently abolished

about the time of the 20th party congress in 1956, has been reactivated with the appointment of Lt. Gen. P. I. Yefimov in midsummer, and the three deputies thus far identified have been named since January.

Changes in chiefs of political directorates have occurred in at least three fourths of the districts and fleets. While a few of these changes might be the result of normal rotation, such a large number in a short period of time indicates a general overhaul of the directorate's secondary leadership. In some cases a lieutenant general, previously identified only as a member of the military council of the district, has also been assigned to head the political directorate, replacing a major general. Some of the major generals have remained as deputies.

Failure to evaluate party political work properly was

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958**

one of the charges levied against Marshal Zhukov. Since his removal, the central committee has issued a resolution on political work in the armed forces and revised its standing instructions to party organizations of the army and navy. The GPU has now issued new regulations for Marxist-Leninist night universities and party schools in preparation for the new academic year.

The regulations stress increased study of party history, political economy, and dialectical materialism. They also provide for advanced schools "open to generals, admirals, officers, and workers, and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy who have either college education or have finished their studies at the Marxist-Leninist night universities."

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

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LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT SURVIVES TEST

Prime Minister Phoui Sannanikone has survived a critical test in the National Assembly over the controversial monetary reform. In a procedural maneuver on 11 October, Phoui was able to defeat a no-confidence motion raised against him by the leftist Santiphab party. The conservative Rally of the Lao People (RLP) closed ranks behind the government despite the strong distaste of many RLP deputies for currency devaluation.

The government still faces a struggle over its budget, and the extension of the assembly session until 30 October gives the opposition additional time to raise a no-confidence motion. In addition, the opposition will probably attempt to emasculate or suppress government-sponsored anti-Communist organizations by making additional cuts in their proposed budgets.

The opposition, however, has lost its most explosive

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

issues now that monetary reform has been implemented and the divisive pressures that threatened to split the RLP have been contained, at least for the time being. It also appears likely that ex-Premier Souvanna Phouma will be appointed ambassador to France, thus removing from the scene one of Phoui's principal rivals within conservative ranks.

The government may now turn its attention to the reforms and antisubversive measures necessary for successful

competition with the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) in the national elections in late 1959 or 1960. Since their electoral debacle in May, conservative politicians have been preoccupied with intramural political maneuvering in Vientiane --merging conservative parties into the RLP, forming an anti-Communist government, and undertaking monetary reform. During this period the NLHZ has had practically a free hand in the 25X1 provinces, and it is making gains in almost every sector of Laotian society.

DISCONTENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Considerable discontent has developed among various groups in South Vietnam with the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Criticism is directed primarily against the President's relatives and close associates, but his authoritarian tactics are also under fire. There is no alternative strong leader to hold divisive forces in check, and Diem's sudden removal from office would probably lead to political chaos.

Criticism of Diem's authoritarianism is being heard increasingly among influential Vietnamese, including members of his cabinet. These critics feel Diem's unwillingness to delegate authority is hampering progress and seriously weakening the regime. There is also growing resentment within the National Assembly, which feels it is being used as a rubber stamp for legislation imposed from above.

The activities of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President's brother and chief political adviser, are responsible for much dissatisfaction within the governmental structure. Nhu, head of

the semicovert Can Lao party, which controls all political activity in Vietnam, is building a network of commissar-like agents strategically placed throughout the government. This system stifles initiative, and rewards on the basis of political reliability rather than ability.

Nhu's efforts to strengthen Can Lao influence within the armed forces and security services are particularly dangerous in view of growing resentment on the part of professional officers over political interference. The military in general is considered loyal to Diem, but the possibility of an eventual coup by disgruntled elements cannot be discounted.

Other factors working against the regime's popularity in commercial, labor, and professional circles, as well as among the masses, are bureaucratic red tape, heavy-handed control measures, curtailment of press and civil liberties, and venality among civil servants. Regionalism--friction between Vietnamese of northern and southern origin--and

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

mounting discontent over Vietnamese repression among tribal groups in the highlands are also potential trouble sources. Remnant dissident sect bands and the Vietnamese Communist underground provide a nucleus of armed opposition to the Diem regime.


Against this backdrop of adverse conditions, Diem is determinedly pushing several ambitious programs--notably agrarian reform, resettlement, land development, and limited industrialization--which hold

promise of mitigating many of the regime's present problems. The chief immediate threat is the ever-present danger of Diem's assassination. In 1957, Diem narrowly missed assassination when bullets intended for him seriously wounded a cabinet member; subsequently, other attempts on his life have been reported. Despite constitutional provision for the vice president to succeed in an emergency, divisive forces are so strong that a debilitating power struggle would probably occur.

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IRELAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

Ireland has taken an unusually active role in international affairs since 1955, when it was admitted to the United Nations, and on several occasions has taken a position which diverges sharply from that of other Western nations.



AIKEN

While Irish foreign policy is still directed toward the traditional desire for neutrality and is firmly anti-Communist, the De Valera government is increasingly concerned with the inflexibility of the East-West power blocs and the threat of

a general war. Consequently, the government shows a growing tendency to seek compromises through the UN on controversial problems.

Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken, who is mainly responsible for Ireland's more aggressive approach, believes the UN's chief value is the opportunity it affords small nations like Ireland to influence the great powers. His proposal for the phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe, his insistence that the Chinese UN representation question is a matter for discussion in the General Assembly, and his most recent suggestion that the possession of atomic weapons be limited to the US, the UK, the USSR, and France are admitted attempts on his part to break down increasing rigidity on these issues.

Ireland has also taken a more active interest in colonial problems since joining the UN. In a speech before the UN General Assembly in September 1957, Aiken suggested setting up a UN investigative commission in Algeria; and at the height of the Middle East

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

crisis last summer, Ireland announced that it favored the neutralization of the Middle East. The external affairs minister has also recently indicated that Ireland is considering supporting Greece's UN resolution on Cyprus.

While Aiken's independent attitude vis-a-vis other Western nations has been criticized by the opposition party and the Catholic hierarchy as indirect aid to the Soviet bloc and has apparently even disturbed the Irish UN delegation, it has the full support of Prime Minister de Valera and has encountered no

strong opposition. The press and public opinion obviously approve the publicity Ireland has received because of its foreign policy approach.

Aiken denies that his foreign policy initiatives are either inimical to Western interests or injurious to Ireland's determination to maintain its position of neutrality. He maintains, however, that Ireland, along with other small nations, must continue an active role in the UN in order to bring about a reduction in East-West tension and to avert a world war.

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THE WEST AND THE DANUBE RIVER

Vienna's imminent adherence to the bloc-dominated Eastern Danube Convention on navigational rights has stirred considerable diplomatic activity in Paris. The French, who have long sought to regain some voice in navigational affairs on the Danube, are pressing for a new Western attempt to revise the 1948 convention. While a number of problems remain to be solved, some kind of joint demarche to Austria, and eventually to the bloc riparian powers, seems likely.

The French fear that Austrian membership in the convention would be followed by West German membership and that the status quo on the river would thus be frozen.

France suggested trying to "induce" Austria to make its membership contingent on a number of revisions --primarily with respect to navigational rights of non-riparian powers and the arbitration of disputes which may arise. In return for these revisions, Vienna could "offer" the bloc

members eventual West German adherence, Western recognition, some link between the convention and the UN, and abrogation of the ineffective 1921 Danube Convention.

Despite reservations about aspects of this "package deal," Britain and other Western European powers with historic interests on the Danube are prepared to go along with some attempt to liberalize the administration of the Danube. While France is willing to ask Austria to conduct "exploratory soundings," other countries are skeptical of using Austria as an intermediary between East and West. Bonn is concerned that a Western bid for nonriparian observers on the Danube Commission might raise problems with East Germany or lead to similar demands from the bloc with respect to the Rhine Commission, but it is evidently ready to support the French in a separate approach to Vienna.

Prospects for the French demarche are uncertain. The Austrian commitment to enter the

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958****Commercial Navigation in the Danube Basin**

Eastern Danube Convention was made by Chancellor Raab during his Moscow visit last July, and Vienna is probably unwilling to attach any conditions to its membership. Nevertheless, if revision of the convention would further guarantee navigational rights or pave the way for West German adherence, it is quite possible that Vienna would lend its support.

As far as the bloc is concerned, German as well as Austrian membership and the long-

delayed Western recognition of the 1948 convention would be a political victory. Minor revisions which do not threaten bloc control of the convention would not be a very high price to pay for this--especially if the USSR could in return secure some voice in the administration of the Rhine. Moscow might also welcome a final settlement now in view of the potential significance of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal which when completed, perhaps by 1972--will link the Atlantic Ocean and the Black Sea.

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
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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

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BRAZILIAN ELECTION RETURNS

The illegal but influential Brazilian Communist party (PCB) has suffered a setback in the important Sao Paulo and Federal District areas as a result of the 3 October congressional and gubernatorial elections, and its political bargaining power there may be severely diminished. President Kubitschek's middle-of-the-road Social Democratic party was not prominently involved in the key contests in these areas since it has only marginal support there. Kubitschek's party is apparently losing substantially to both

the right and the left in other contests but seems certain to retain by a small margin its position as the largest single party in the Brazilian Congress.

While the vote tabulation is still less than half complete in many states, the important contests in the key Sao Paulo and Federal District areas have already been decided and have swung against the Communist-backed candidates in most cases. This resulted partly from a split in the Communist ranks and partly from an unprecedented

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

church-backed campaign against candidates willing to accept Communist backing. In both areas, large segments of the PCB rank and file openly disagreed with the political endorsements of party chief Luiz Carlos Prestes and in some cases even campaigned for candidates competing with his choices. This was especially marked in the Sao Paulo gubernatorial race.

Prestes, who had been in hiding for a decade until last March, apparently hoped that by backing favorites and at the same time expounding his new "soft" line--a combination of bourgeois and nationalist sentiments--he could prepare the ground for legalizing the party. Instead, he further split his divided party and also opened the door for an unprecedented

wave of anti-Communist propaganda. While some of the propaganda was mere political opportunism, it, together with Prestes' inability to deliver the vote, has caused some local politicians to speculate for the first time on whether official Communist support may not now become a liability.

Neither the anti-Communist trend nor the PCB split has been nationwide, however, and Communist-backed gubernatorial candidates are leading in at least two other states, including the state of Rio de Janeiro. In Pernambuco, a Communist-backed industrialist running on a "conservative" ticket has been conceded the election and, since the election, has appeared openly on the streets with leading local Communists.

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
EGYPT'S COTTON SITUATION

Egypt failed to sell for cash a substantial amount of its cotton during the marketing year which ended in August. As in the past two seasons, the Soviet bloc, which buys on a barter basis, took more than half the export crop. Egypt entered the present cotton-marketing year with about a 23-percent larger surplus than a year ago, chiefly because of a new record crop.

Throughout the recently concluded marketing season, Cairo attempted to offset the dampening effect on sales caused by its depreciated currency, largely the result of the Suez crisis, and by the artificially high cotton prices resulting from Soviet trading practices. Discounts given

**EGYPT
DISPOSITION OF COTTON
SUPPLY**

(THOUSANDS OF US BALES)*



*US BALE = 480 LBS.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

Western purchasers probably averaged 30 percent, but despite these incentives, sales for Western currency have been slow. Although Egypt exported approxi-


traditionally large buyers, have not purchased Egyptian cotton at the levels normal before the Suez crisis.

Prospects for disposing of the recently harvested crop are mixed. The Communist world will probably increase its total take this year, but the value of cotton shipments to the bloc might be reduced. As a result of Egyptian discounts to Western cotton purchasers, the Communist world is paying a premium ranging upward to 30 percent, and there have been reports that Moscow is dissatisfied with what amounts to substantial Egyptian price discrimination.

In seeking increased sales to the West, Cairo will continue to face the problems of both a world oversupply of cotton and stiff price competition. Trade reports indicate that discounts will continue to average about 30 percent and may be even larger. The re-entry of traditional Western customers into the market in force appears unlikely at this time. Competition with the Sudan for important Western markets will probably be more intense this year than last, as Khartoum has shown its willingness in recent months to cut prices to more than meet similar Egyptian moves.

(Concurred in
by ORR)

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mately 30 percent more cotton than a year earlier--a total of 1,187,238 bales--exports to the West rose only 12.5 percent. Exports to Communist countries increased over 46 percent, with the Sino-Soviet bloc buying about 60 percent of the total. Thus far, France and Britain,

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

COMMUNISTS DROP CONCEPT OF CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT

In an attempt to adjust Communist doctrine to current political objectives as well as to the USSR's international position, Soviet ideologists have virtually abandoned the theory of "capitalist encirclement." In its place has emerged the doctrine of "two world camps," which foresees the eventual victory of Communism in the world arena through aggressive but primarily peaceful political maneuvers. At the same time, however, it is emphasized that the ending of capitalist encirclement is not the signal for the "withering away" of the Soviet state, which must instead be strengthened against the last-ditch hostility of the "imperialists," as primarily manifested in the ring of military bases on foreign soil.

The notion of the USSR as a socialist island in a hostile capitalist sea dates from Lenin's pronouncement in 1921 that the Soviet nation was completely surrounded by bourgeois states which would seize the first opportunity to "send back their own people and re-establish the rule of the landlords and the bourgeoisie." The resultant doctrine held that capitalist encirclement was both geographical and political in nature; while working incessantly against the interests of the socialist state in the international arena, capitalists would send "spies, wreckers, and diversionists" to undermine Soviet power from within. This meant that the masses of the people had always to maintain a high degree of "revolutionary vigilance" against these ever-present class enemies.

Practical application of this dogma was provided by Stalin, who used the "extremely

real and unpleasant phenomenon" of capitalist encirclement as one of the basic ideological excuses for mass repression and purges. During the mid-1930's, imperialist wreckers and spies were said to be everywhere, and "revolutionary vigilance" became a synonym for denunciation to the secret police.

In the philosophical realm, one of the Marxist articles of faith is that the state will "wither away" when a classless society has been established. The question of when the Soviet state apparatus would begin to disappear was frequently asked after 1936, when Stalin proclaimed socialism and asserted that the exploiting classes had been liquidated in the USSR and that the lines separating workers, peasants, and intelligentsia were being obliterated. Capitalist encirclement provided the answer, for as long as this condition existed, the state had to remain strong in order to defend socialism. This precept underwent no fundamental changes until well after the Second World War.

Attempts at Redefinition

That the whole doctrine of capitalist encirclement needed re-examination must have become increasingly clear to Communist philosophers as they witnessed the rapid spread of the socialist movement after 1945. The addition of the East European satellites and of the Chinese Communist regime greatly increased the size of the Communist bloc, and strong Communist movements had grown up in France, Italy, and other "imperialist" countries. While it was still possible to reason on a purely geographic basis that Moscow and its vassals

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

were surrounded, the old encirclement dogma was obviously losing some of its validity.

Initial attempts to update the theory were cautious. One of the first of these was made in February 1955, when Foreign Minister Molotov told the USSR Supreme Soviet that "one cannot now speak of the USSR and capitalist encirclement in the same sense as before. To do so, he said, would be to ignore, or at least to underestimate, postwar changes in the international situation. Molotov did not state that capitalist encirclement had ended; he claimed that capitalism had been pushed back by the formation of a powerful camp headed by the USSR and China and consisting of those countries which had made "only the first, but very important, steps toward socialism."

This idea was developed further by the 20th party congress a year later. Khrushchev and Suslov both implied that the days of encirclement were over, and Deputy Premier Mikoyan stated flatly: "The time is past when we were an oasis in the midst of capitalist encirclement." Mikoyan claimed that the Communist bloc had achieved political parity with the West and that socialism had become "incomparably stronger than capitalism in the minds of men."

Apparently the Soviet leaders had concluded on the one hand that a more offensive posture would prove effective and on the other that the struggle against the West could best be waged in the world political arena, rather than at the military frontiers between the power blocs. One of the new tactics was to stop assuming that all countries beyond the bloc were tools of world imperialism; the leaders came to discriminate between various shades of political alignment,

even among allies of the United States.

The 20th congress therefore abandoned Stalin's old notion that "whoever is not with us is against us." The new line was to be based on the increased strength of the bloc and on the spread of socialism as a political idea. Two camps remained in the world, but the peace-loving socialist camp was no longer surrounded by capitalism. In March 1958, Mikoyan exemplified this altered situation with his statements that encirclement in both its geographic and political senses was over and that "if we speak of capitalist encirclement now, it must be said that the capitalist gentlemen are being increasingly surrounded by the ideas of socialism in their own countries."

Several days later, on 19 March, Khrushchev told a Western newsman that the whole concept of capitalist encirclement seriously needed a more accurate definition, since it was not known "who encircles whom"; one billion people were already living under a socialist system and nobody really knew how many people held socialist ideas in other countries.

Complications

With Khrushchev's official blessing thus bestowed on a redefinition of the encirclement idea, and, on the basis of the physical size of the Communist bloc, it would seem a simple matter to write off capitalist encirclement as a doctrine. To do so would make it clear that Communism had gone over to the offensive throughout the world and would emphasize further the "all-conquering nature of Marxism-Leninism." It would facilitate the propagation of socialist faith by peaceful political means, primarily in the uncommitted neutralist countries, but even in the capitalist lands themselves, the United States included.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

There is reason to believe, however, that the Kremlin was much concerned with other possible consequences. Once the period of capitalist encirclement was officially declared at an end, one of the principal ideological rationalizations for maintaining a strong state apparatus would be removed. Although there had never been an easy way to determine when a classless society would be created, there had been more than 20 years of progress toward that goal since Stalin had claimed that the exploiting classes had been liquidated in the USSR. Under these conditions, then, it would be possible to raise anew the question of when the withering away of the state would begin in the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that he had made it clear that the state could not wither away completely until full Communism had been established, Khrushchev himself had told an American journalist in 1957 that, "properly speaking," the process was already under way because certain changes had been made in the organs of state compulsion.

The problem was further complicated by Yugoslav claims that popular participation in their workers' councils and communes meant that the state was already withering away in Yugoslavia, which admittedly had achieved neither a classless society nor Communism. Such assertions were already common by April of this year, when they were treated extensively in Vice President Kardelj's address to the Yugoslav party congress.

Belgrade's ideologists also had something to say about capitalist encirclement. Pointing to such phenomena as social legislation and the increasing diffusion of capital in the "imperialist countries, they

claimed that socialism in varying degrees is actually developing on an evolutionary basis throughout the world. Under these conditions "capitalist encirclement" is impossible, the Yugoslavs said, dismissing the theory as a fiction cooked up by Moscow to justify the Stalinist claim that the world was divided into two antagonistic camps.

Soviet theoreticians had to come up with a neatly packaged formula which would counter Belgrade's heresy and write off the doctrine of encirclement without at the same time weakening the ideological underpinnings of the Kremlin dictatorship. Central committee secretary Petr Pospelov, a veteran Marxist philosopher, sounded the keynote of the new line in his Lenin Day address on 23 April. "It would be wrong now to speak of capitalist encirclement," Pospelov said, "because the forces of the USSR and the whole socialist system have become so strong that it is no longer possible to encircle them, to put them in the position of a besieged fortress as the Soviet Union was for decades."

Despite this good news, he warned that the danger of imperialist wars would remain as long as imperialism exists. This line was picked up two weeks later by the government organ Izvestia, which added that aggressive imperialism is still trying by every means to overthrow socialism, and therefore the "state must be improved and strengthened" for the defense against imperialist attack and as the main instrument for building Communism.

The New Line

The doctrine of capitalist encirclement was further relegated to history on 16 August. An article in the air force journal Soviet Aviation stressed

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

that the USSR had been surrounded by hostile capitalist countries from October 1917 until the end of the Second World War. The gap in encirclement, which began with the "rout of the fascist forces and the emergence of socialist states in Eastern Europe, led to its complete liquidation with the formation of the Chinese People's Republic" in 1949.

As a result of the growth of the socialist camp, encirclement ceased to exist in both the geographical and the political sense. This proclamation, too, ended on a note of warning: "The Communist party always emphasized the danger of capitalist encirclement and still challenges the entire Soviet nation to display unwearying vigilance and strengthen the defensive might of the USSR."

The question of the withering away of the state remains unchanged. The current line is that the "working class of every country building socialism is interested in the strengthening of the state as the inflexible instrument for the defense

of the country against imperialist plots, and therefore the state is necessary to the proletariat for the entire historical period, until such time as a classless Communist society is built and the entire capitalist system has been liquidated."

Fundamentally, the only thing that has changed since Lenin's 1921 pronouncement is the mere fact of capitalist encirclement. As a doctrine it has been replaced by the "two camps" dogma. One of these camps is dedicated to furthering socialism by peaceful political means, first in the neutral countries and then throughout the world; the other is warlike and seeks by every means to destroy socialism. In this situation Moscow's theoreticians can assert that the Soviet state (i.e., the Kremlin dictatorship) will not begin to wither for many years to come. As in the 1930's, their demands for ever-increased vigilance against the imperialists can be used as an excuse for repression whenever the leaders deem it necessary.

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NEW ROLE FOR PAKISTAN'S ARMY

The active political role assumed by the army in Pakistan is one of the most important effects of the take-over by President Mirza and Army Commander in Chief Ayub on 7 October. Military leaders have chosen to exercise power which they have long held but have refrained from using. The traditional character of the army has been undergoing far-reaching social and economic changes. Its present exposure to political influences is likely to accentuate these trends, perhaps undermine its prestige in the country, especially

in East Pakistan, and lessen its effectiveness as a stabilizing force.

Pakistan's military and security forces total 265,019 men, including a 172,000-man army. More than 80 percent of the forces have been recruited from West Pakistan. Although some of the forces are still using obsolete British equipment, most of the regular forces are being equipped with American equipment under a \$475,000,000 program, of which Pakistan has received \$260,000,000 since the aid agreement was signed in 1954.

SECRET

16 October 1958



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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

power, and always had the capability to take over the government, it apparently was reluctant to resort to a forcible seizure of power.

Changing Character of Army

In recent years new social and economic forces have begun to work a subtle change in the character of the Pakistani Army. Essentially, these influences reflect the changing character of Pakistan itself, from which the army is finding it difficult to remain insulated. At the same time, the traditional British influence has gradually lessened, particularly among the junior grades.

**PAKISTAN
MILITARY ALLOCATIONS**
MILLION DOLLARS

	BUDGET	US AID
1955-56	172	19
1956-57	185	38
1957-58	183	27
1958-59	185	26

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16 OCT. 1958

One result is an alteration in the social composition of the officer group. A new middle class is emerging with the growth in urban life, from which a growing number of officer candidates are selected. The interests of these younger officers are somewhat different from those of the old-line officers. While "esprit de corps" remains relatively high, there is now greater preoccupation with the ordinary business of making a living.

These trends have lessened the sense of paternalism which the old Indian Army officer

showed toward his subordinates. Since the officers who received their training from the British have nearly all been promoted to top posts, it is increasingly difficult for them to transmit to the junior officers and enlisted men on a man-to-man basis the standards and values of their tradition.

Perhaps the most important factor making for change in the armed services is economic. The social and financial security which formerly accompanied a military career in Pakistan is no longer as great. Officers, especially in the junior grades, are being placed under considerable financial strain, primarily because the financially pressed government is less able to protect their incomes against the effects of inflation or raise them to levels reached by other groups.

Effects of New Political Role

Disillusionment over mounting political and economic instability in recent months caused a number of influential officers to think seriously of firm action by the army to remedy the situation. While it is not yet clear who was the prime mover behind the Mirza-Ayub coup of 7 October, it seems likely that Ayub, supported by a group of army commanders, readily went along with the plan. The army at least quickly accepted its new political role, if it did not in fact demand it.

Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of the Mirza-Ayub take-over is the new position in which it has placed the Pakistani Army. Having made the decision to enter the political arena, the army now is exposed to the same disruptive influences it has condemned among politicians. Despite efforts to maintain the protective shield against these influences, it seems doubtful that the army can remain immune to political

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

subversion, factionalism, and corruption. It is more likely that the changing trends already discernible among the armed services will be accentuated, thus involving the officer corps more and more closely with the political practices of previous governments.

Politics at the highest level in the army is not new

conflicts often take the form of rivalries between the Punjabi officers and those from the northwest frontier--the Pathan tribal "clique" led by Ayub. In addition, there has been some competition between officers native to West Pakistan, such as the Punjabis and Pathans, and those who come from Moslem communities located in what is now India. Resentment reported on the part of other officers toward Ayub's policies during his nearly eight years as commander in chief is likely to intensify as he takes a more active part in administering the country.

There are indications, moreover, that certain elements in the officer group do not approve of Mirza and his autocratic ways, and may not be inclined to support a Mirza-Ayub dictatorship indefinitely. Since the army's previously solid loyalty to Ayub has been questioned during the past year, the possibility in the long run of an attempted countercoup by a dissident officer group should not be dismissed.

Conflicts between the army leadership and the top echelons of Pakistan's navy and air force

could also develop if the army does not share its power with the other services. Immediate reaction to the take-over among naval officers indicates some tendency to question Ayub's action.

Another detrimental effect of the army's new role would be the probable depletion of its defensive potential if many units were dispersed to administer the country under martial law. Ayub apparently hopes to avoid this danger by relying on government departments and civil courts to the maximum extent possible. However, since corruption and political influence have in recent years become prevalent in the civil service as well as among politicians, the new regime may be unable to carry out its promised reforms.

The military coup puts the enormous prestige of the army on trial before public opinion. Much of the average Pakistanis' pride in the army probably stems from its high standards and aloofness from the scramble for political power. Whether this popular image will be maintained is likely to depend on the length of the period of martial law and the behavior of the army in its more active role. On previous occasions when the army was called in--as in Lahore where martial law was imposed for two months in 1953--the reaction was favorable. Prolongation of martial law, however, probably would cause unrest and eventually resistance. This would be more likely to develop in East Pakistan, where there is an antimartial tradition and resentment of domination by West Pakistanis, who form the backbone of the army.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**


16 October 1958

LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESSES

Latin American Communist parties, which have been notably active this year in political campaigns and elections in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Costa Rica, are also displaying considerable interest in holding national party congresses. Two parties have held congresses recently and four more may call such top-level

meetings within the next six months--as contrasted with only two during the preceding two-year period. The newly won legal status of parties in Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia may account in part for the timing of congresses in those countries.

At the 40th anniversary celebrations in Moscow in 1957,

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

sharp Soviet criticism of Latin American Communist parties for lack of coordination of their activities may also have stimulated efforts to convene congresses as a means of correcting the deficiency. Along with the regional conferences already held in Mexico and Argentina this year--reportedly with Soviet inspiration--these congresses will probably serve to promote liaison and exchanges among Latin American Communist parties, encourage the parties to adapt international directives to local conditions, and lead to a strengthening of internal party organizations.

Parties With Legal Status

The Communist parties in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela have regained legal status since late 1957, and the first two now are planning congresses. In Venezuela, where the Communists are members of national political and labor organizations and have registered other impressive gains since the ouster of dictator Perez last January, the party has recently held a plenum of the central committee, which was expanded to include 40 regional delegates. This meeting apparently was designed as an interim substitute for a full-scale congress. Venezuela has also initiated some preparations for a congress, which the party has recognized as "urgent," to be held at an unscheduled date after the national elections in November.

The timing of the Chilean Communist party (PCCh) congress, which is now set for November, was probably in part determined by the fact that the PCCh regained legal status in August. It must also replace the deceased secretary general and consider other internal questions, especially the party's political policy after the 4 September presidential elections in which the Communist-backed Socialist candidate was runner-

up. The PCCh has been prominent in the Communist international labor movement and other activities, and it may invite representatives from various Latin American Communist parties, notably the Argentine party, with which it seems to have close relations.

**LATIN AMERICA
STATUS OF COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESSES**

	NUMBER AND YEAR OF LAST PARTY CONGRESS (PRIOR TO 1958)		CONGRESSES SCHEDULED OR HELD IN 1958
ARGENTINA	XI	1946	—
BOLIVIA	?	?	—
BRAZIL	IV	1954	(1) —
CHILE	X	1956	XI - NOV.
COLOMBIA	VII	1952	VIII - NOV./DEC.
COSTA RICA	II	1952	—
CUBA	VII	1952	(2) —
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	—	—	—
ECUADOR	VI	1957	—
EL SALVADOR	I	1948	—
GUATEMALA	II	1952	—
HAITI	—	—	—
HONDURAS	—	—	I - APRIL
MEXICO	XII	1954	(3) —
NICARAGUA	I	1948	—
PANAMA	III	1951	—
PARAGUAY	—	—	—
PERU	III	1948	—
URUGUAY	XVI	1955	XVII - AUG.
VENEZUELA	II	1948	(4) —

(1) Fifth Congress now scheduled for 1959

(2) Last plenum of Cuban Socialist (Communist) party central committee held in 1954

(3) Thirteenth Congress postponed from September to January 1959

(4) Third Congress being planned for after November 1958

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16 OCTOBER 1958

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The Colombian Communist party (PCC), which regained legality in December 1957, now plans to hold a national congress--originally set for August--in late 1958. It may invite representatives of the Venezuelan Communist party, with which it is conducting liaison, and other Latin American parties.

(Uruguayan, Mexican Congresses)

The congresses of the legal Uruguayan (PCU) and Mexican (PCM)

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

Communist parties were apparently scheduled in accordance with party statutes. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the congress of the PCU from 15 to 20 August was the first full-scale congress to be held in Latin America since the Ecuadoran Communist party congress of May 1957. Communist representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela were present, indicating some effort to exchange regional Communist experiences--an objective of a meeting of northern Communist party leaders held in Mexico in March 1958. In addition, Soviet, Czech, Bulgarian, French, and Spanish Communists who attended the meetings increased the foreign representation to the highest of any congress in PCU history.

The Mexican congress, originally scheduled for late September in the northern city of Torreon, has been postponed to January 1959. [REDACTED]

Status of Other Congresses

Communist congresses in Brazil and Peru, where the parties are illegal, have been periodically postponed for over a year because of internal dissensions. The Argentine Communist party (PCA), which now is believed to be the largest in Latin America, has not held a formal national congress since 1946, although it convened briefly in November 1957 to proclaim its candidates and platform for the general elections in February 1958. The PCA, however, was host to a Communist regional "disarmament" conference in Buenos Aires last May at which

representatives of Mexico and all South American countries except Bolivia were reportedly present. This meeting probably provided an opportunity for Latin American Communists to improve their liaison work as proposed at the earlier meeting in Mexico.

[REDACTED] the small and illegal parties in Central America, Panama, and the Caribbean republics have not held national congresses for several years and apparently have no plans for convening them in 1958. The Dominican People's Socialist (Communist) party-in-exile, however, held a clandestine conference in 1958 which, in representation, was apparently similar to a congress, according to the new international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism.

Sino-Soviet Interests

Although the Sino-Soviet bloc has displayed increasing commercial and diplomatic interest in Latin America since 1956--particularly as reflected in statements of top Soviet and Chinese Communist officials and in a mounting Sino-Soviet propaganda and trade effort in the area--there is little indication that the bloc has directly

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****16 October 1958**

encouraged parties in the western hemisphere to hold national congresses.

The USSR normally gives publicity to Latin American party congresses, such as the TASS news coverage on the August meeting of the Uruguayan Communist party. A Soviet delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Rio de Janeiro traveled to Montevideo to attend the congress, a gesture possibly intended to lend prestige to the sessions and provide some guidance on international issues. The attendance of a Polish delegation at the Mexican congress would also probably give international prestige to the sessions.

The guidance obtained by Latin American Communists attending Sino-Soviet party congresses and other meetings in recent years--the number has been sizable--has been reflected in Latin American Communist congresses. Chinese Communist influence on the Ecuadoran Communist party congress in 1957 was substantial and resulted from attendance by top Ecuadoran Communists at the eighth congress of the Chinese Communist party in Peiping in 1956. The regional Communist meetings held this year in Mexico and Buenos Aires appear to have been organized as a result of Soviet instructions to Latin American delegates at the 40th anniversary celebrations in Moscow in 1957.

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SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

16 October 1958

ANNEX**SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
SOUTH OF THE SAHARA**

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1. General Bloc Policy: In Africa South of the Sahara Moscow's principal efforts are directed toward influencing Black African nationalist independence movements. The USSR wishes eventually to become protector and adviser of a group of independent, socialist-oriented, anti-Western states there.

2. The general level of Communist activity in the area is steadily increasing and is being energetically pursued. Official governmental activity is still largely exploratory and its impact has so far been slight. This effort is handicapped by the primitive social organizations that exist and by the bloc's lack of access to the area. In colonial areas bloc efforts have been further frustrated by the close controls on the part of the metropolitan governments, which have prevented development of extensive contacts and firsthand reconnaissance. The main bloc diplomatic effort is focused on Ghana and to a lesser extent Liberia--the two independent Black African states in the area. Bloc policy parallels the UAR's efforts to stimulate and control African nationalism, and Moscow has fully endorsed the growth of exclusively African regionalism to counter Western political and economic influence.

3. The bloc is also working to achieve its aims through international Communist-front groups and Communist-controlled labor movements to establish itself with articulate individual Black African leaders, includ-

ing ultranationalist exiles. Through them it hopes to influence trade union, youth, and political movements, as well as to mold and direct the political cadres of future independent states. Local African Communists, while generally weak, are working to penetrate trade union and political organizations and exploit racial tensions.

4. Diplomatic Representation: Bloc representation is confined to a four-man Czech consulate general in Cape Town and a one-man Czech consulate in Leopoldville. Belgium has refused Russian and Polish requests to open posts in the Congo.

5. Ghana agreed in early 1958 to exchange missions with the USSR at some time in the future and may do so after the pending visit of a commercial delegation to the bloc. This would open up the area to bloc representation and set a precedent that Liberia, which in 1956 committed itself in principle to eventual establishment of relations with Moscow, would probably follow. The Union of South Africa as a matter of policy does not favor formal exchange of missions, but may eventually admit a Polish commercial mission.

6. Economic activity: In 1957 bloc trade with the area amounted to slightly under \$100,000,000, roughly double that of 1956 but amounting to only 1 or 2 percent of the area's total trade. While the bloc has not devoted intensive efforts to Africa South of the Sahara, some economic activity has been focused on Ghana. Expansion of Ghana-USSR trade apparently hinges on the outcome of the pending visit to the bloc of a commercial delegation.

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

Ghana has so far ignored general Soviet declarations of willingness to aid its economic development, but Accra's preoccupation with financing the proposed \$850,000,000 Volta River hydroelectric project provides the bloc with an excellent opportunity to gain stature there by offering credit on attractive terms. An East German delegation was preparing to visit Accra armed with offers to exchange \$3,000,000 worth of industrial installations for Ghanaian raw materials, and a Hungarian trade mission is expected in both Ghana and Nigeria soon. In addition Soviet trawlers have been active off the west coast of Africa for several months during the last half year with the apparent aim of preparing the way for extensive Soviet fishing operations there.

7. Trade with tropical Africa has increased but is still negligible. Colonial trade relations are controlled by Belgium, France, Britain, and Portugal. The Union of South Africa's trade with the bloc has been increasing as the need for markets has grown. A Chinese Communist trade mission visited Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa in June and July and arranged a small-scale barter agreement. It then planned visits to East Africa and colonial territories.

8. The bloc continues to be sensitive to the Eurafrika plan, under which much of colonial Africa's trade and aid activities would occur within a predominantly European framework. Moscow has denounced the plan as an imperialist plot to secure future exploitation rights in Africa. Both the USSR and the UAR have encouraged resistance to Eurafrika through proposed economic associations that are purely African.

9. Cultural and Propaganda Activity: Moscow radio began broadcasting 3.5 hours weekly to Africa in French and English on 19 April. This is the first time a bloc country has labeled a program specifically for this part of Africa, except for a short period of Peiping English-language broadcasts to "Egypt and Central Africa." Moscow probably looks favorably on Cairo radio's espousal of ultranationalism in the area. The importance of broadcasts is increased by the lack of direct access to the area.

10. Lack of access has also affected exchanges of delegations, which consist almost entirely of Africans going to the bloc. During the first half of 1958, the number of exchanges ran somewhat ahead of 1957, when they totaled 26. Most delegates were nationalists or trade union officials.

11. Soviet diplomats are increasing offers of scholarships and travel in the USSR to African nationalist students now studying in Cairo. Some are being asked to remain up to three years and do "anticolonial information work." Between 50 and 90 Africans went to Moscow from Cairo between September and May and seven more were to leave in June. Some of these students will probably be employed in the USSR's own expanding African language-training program in which specialists from Africa will be invited to participate.

12. Subversion: The quickening pace of political activity in Africa, the increasing urbanization and the swelling numbers of African students going abroad increase the opportunity for Communist subversive efforts in the area, even though present activity is severely limited. The Communists are increasingly

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

16 October 1958

exploiting the growing race consciousness among Black Africans.

13. Organized Communist parties are virtually nonexistent; [redacted]

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[redacted] Much of the Communist activity is conducted through the metropolitan parties of Belgium, Britain, and France, with the effort largely confined to direct mail propaganda, penetration of trade unions, and contacting of African students in Europe. In the French possessions, especially Madagascar and French West Africa, Communist parties have made headway through the French Communist party and the local branches of the Communist-dominated French General Confederation of Labor (CGT).

14. African students, the future political leaders of education-starved Africa, are easily met in Europe, and many make trips behind the iron curtain for conferences, escorted tours, or study programs. Most of the 6,000 Africans studying in France are reportedly favorably impressed by Communist promises.

15. Reaction to Bloc Activities: Communism is likely to profit from the rapid development of urbanization which is accompanied by a weakening of traditional tribal ties and a simultaneous increase of nationalism. The Africans tend to identify Communism--which strongly attacks European colonialism--as an ally, and growing numbers of African students and labor leaders are returning to Africa after some indoctrination in Communist theory and methods in Europe. Many of the emerging leaders, even if increasingly aware of Communism's potential sub-

versive danger, feel confident of their ability to control any antigovernment activities after the establishment of relations with the bloc.

16. The European settler populations and colonial governments recognize Communism as a mounting threat to the status quo. They have undertaken negative countermeasures such as selective censorship of mails, strict control over visas, and greater police surveillance of union, student, and political organizations among the non-Europeans.

17. The Outlook: The bloc may be expected to continue its pressure for diplomatic relations and for wider commercial relations, and the unofficial social agitation efforts of international Communist groups will continue to increase. The immediate barrier to expansion of governmental activities remains lack of access. The impact of Communism is likely to increase to the degree that nationalism or independence movements assume a violent character within the framework of the relatively unstable and independent states that are developing. As new African states evolve, Communist influences are most likely to be limited at first but could be extended through exploitation of irredentism and national programs to aid other still-dependent territories in the independence movement. Because of the inherent nationalist distrust of non-African movements, no new African state in the near future is likely to become significantly influenced by Communism. Nevertheless emerging African leaders favor a policy of neutrality between East and West and can be expected to exploit any bloc overtures in order to gain economic assistance from the West.

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